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SUMMARY 
Recently we compared safety analyses for a runway incursion scenario based on 
an event sequence analysis, as a key exponent of a traditional risk assessment 
technique, versus one based on an multi-agent dynamic risk model (DRM), as an 
exponent of new techniques based on system complexity and variability-based 
accident models. We found that lower accident risk levels were assessed in the 
event sequence analysis and we compared various factors contributing to these 
differences. As the reasons of these differences were not completely understood, 
this paper sets forth additional analyses towards a better understanding of the 
relations between conflict recognition and resolution events that may occur in 
the runway incursion scenario and their relation to accident risk. To this end, 
such events were recorded in additional Monte Carlo simulations of the multi-
agent DRM and a broader set of conditions was considered with agents being in 
or out of monitoring roles or control loops. The results of the DRM-based study 
uniquely make clear that the risk is not manifest from the performance of 
individual human operators and technical systems, nor from the sole relations 
between human operators and/or technical systems, but only from the totality of 
the performance and interactions of all human operators and technical systems 
in the operational context considered. In conclusion, we show that multi-agent 
dynamic risk modelling has considerable advantages over event sequence-based 
approaches. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In complex and distributed socio-technical organizations the level of safety 
depends on the interactions between many entities of various types at multiple 
locations. The man-made disasters theory of Turner [1] gives early descriptions 
of how the objective of safely operating technological systems could be 
subverted by normal organizational processes due to unintended and complex 
interactions between contributory preconditions, each of which would be 
unlikely, singly, to defeat the established safety systems. Also Perrow [2] 
describes accidents as the consequence of complex interactions and tight 
couplings in socio-technical systems in his Normal Accident theory, stressing 
that given such system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of 
failure conditions are inevitable. Building forward on the notion of normal 
accidents, Hollnagel [3] argues that performance in complex systems is 
necessarily variable due to the performance variability of its entities and the 
complexity of their interactions. Reasons for variability in the performance of 
humans include the dependency on contextual conditions, the efficiency-
thoroughness trade-off in their performance and the intrinsic variability of 
perceptual and cognitive functions. Accidents may occur as a result of the 
interactions, performance variability, failures and contextual conditions of the 
socio-technical system. 
 
A detailed account of complex interactions and performance variability is 
typically lacking in probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of socio-technical 
systems by traditional event sequence-based techniques such as fault trees (FTs) 
and event trees (ETs). FTs represent relations between events and conditions 
leading to a safety-relevant situation and ETs represent relations between 
possible events following such a situation and the resulting consequences (e.g. 
accidents). They are pictorial representations of Boolean logic relations between 
events and they use event probabilities in PRA. The probabilities of the end 
events can thus be calculated straightforwardly and these end results are 
qualities of the same kind as the data used to obtain them: both are event 
probabilities. FT and ETs have been applied extensively for safety assessment in 
various fields, including air traffic [4][5]. An advantage of these techniques is that 
their structure is transparent and easy to understand. Their limitations include 
the difficultness to represent varieties of interdependencies between 
organizational entities and their dynamics, as well as the restricted evaluation of 
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human performance by human error and conflict resolution probabilities. As 
such their use for risk assessment of complex socio-technical systems tends to 
be problematic [3][6]. 
 
In recognition of the limitations of event sequence-based techniques and in an 
effort to more directly address performance variability in complex socio-
technical systems and the therein emergent safety risks, various methods have 
been developed. These developments include FRAM [3], which pursues a 
qualitative analysis of safety-critical interdependencies in a functional model of 
an operation, STAMP [6], which uses system theoretic modelling of control loops 
and processes to obtain quantitative results on safety-related process variables, 
and TOPAZ [7], which uses multi-agent dynamic risk models (DRM) to obtain 
accident risk probabilities of air traffic scenarios. In multi-agent DRM accident 
risk is an emergent property [8][9] that is obtained by simulation of the dynamics 
of interacting elements in safety relevant scenarios and which uses data of these 
dynamics that is of a completely different nature than the accident risk. Although 
system complexity and performance variability-based safety assessment 
methods are not yet part of the standard repertoire of techniques and are being 
further developed, they have already been applied in several practical safety 
assessments, such as assessment of NASA’s safety culture by STAMP [10] or risk 
assessment of operations of the ANSP in the Netherlands (LVNL) by TOPAZ. 
 
To relate these two ways of thinking about the development of accidents, we 
performed a benchmark study for safety analyses of a particular runway 
incursion scenario [11][12]. In these papers we compared the results of an event 
sequence-based analysis with those of an assessment using a multi-agent DRM. 
We found that lower accident risk levels were assessed in the event sequence 
analysis and we compared various factors contributing to these differences. As 
the reasons of these differences were not completely understood, this paper 
goes beyond benchmarking by running additional Monte Carlo simulations in 
order to gain a better understanding of the relations between conflict recognition 
and resolution events that may occur in the runway incursion scenario and their 
relation to accident risk. Furthermore, this paper sets forth to contrast the 
probability of agents’ conflict recognition and conflict resolution events with the 
risk effects of a broader set of hypothetical condition in the operation, where 
agents are in or out of monitoring roles or control loops. In this way we aim to 
better understand the potential of agents to restrict the risk increase in cases 
where the performance of other agents is affected.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the runway incursion-
related safety studies. Section 3 describes the methods and results of the event 
sequence-based safety assessment. Section 4 describes the methods and results 
of the DRM-based safety assessment. Section 5 defines additional events in the 
MC simulations of the DRM and the results achieved. Section 6 presents the risk 
results for conditions with agents being in or out of the monitoring and control 
loops. Section 7 discusses the results of the event sequence and DRM 
approaches and their implications. Section 8 presents the conclusion of this 
research. 
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2 RUNWAY INCURSION-RELATED SAFETY 
STUDIES 
2.1 RUNWAY INCURSION 
A runway incursion is defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) as “Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an 
aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the 
landing and take off of aircraft” [13]. Within air traffic, the risk of runway 
incursion is recognised as an important safety issue. Safety programmes such as 
[13][14] promote procedures and training to reduce runway incursion risk, such 
as following ICAO compliant procedures and naming, applying standard 
radiotelephony (R/T) phraseology, pilot training on aerodrome signage and 
markings, using standard taxi routes, etc. In addition, technology is being used 
and developed to reduce the likelihood and consequences of runway incursions, 
such as alerting systems and traffic displays. Assessment of runway incursion 
risk and of the potential effect of runway incursion risk reducing measures and 
technologies are demanding tasks, given the large number of human operators, 
aircraft and supporting technical systems that closely interact on the aerodrome. 
This complexity makes runway incursion-related safety assessments suitable 
candidates for comparison of the two types of accident models.   
 
2.2 SAFETY ASSESSMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TAXIING OPERATIONS AT 
AMSTERDAM AIRPORT 
The two safety assessments were done for an active runway crossing operation in 
good visibility conditions. The operation was proposed for crossing of runway 
18C/36C at Amsterdam airport for traffic coming from and going to a new 
parallel runway 18R/36L. During the development of infrastructure and 
operational concepts for taxiing to the new runway, various risk assessment 
studies were done; their history is described in detail in [15]. These studies 
included the use of event sequences for the assessment of the risk of various 
safety relevant scenarios of the active runway crossing operation [16]. Having 
recognized the complexity of some of these scenarios, this led to the 
development of a multi-agent DRM for a scenario of the active runway crossing 
operation [17][18]. Since this DRM was developed for the same operation and 
considered the same set of hazards contributing to the safety relevant scenario, 
  
 
 
 
 
10 NLR-TP-2011-291 July 2011  
 
the models and results of these two studies provide a suitable basis for the 
comparison of event sequence and multi-agent DRM-based risk assessment 
approaches.  
 
2.3 ACTIVE RUNWAY CROSSING OPERATION 
As the focus in this study is not on the specific results for Amsterdam airport 
obtained in the safety assessments, but rather on the followed lines of 
reasoning, in the remainder of the paper we discuss the operation and its 
context in generic terms. The runway considered is used for departures and has 
a taxiway that crosses the runway at a distance of 1000 m from the runway 
threshold. The visibility conditions are good. 
 
The main human operators involved in the runway crossing operation are the 
pilots of the taking-off aircraft, the pilots of the taxiing aircraft, the runway 
controller and the ground controllers responsible for traffic on nearby taxiways. 
The pilots are responsible for safe conduct of the flight operations and should 
actively monitor for potential conflicting traffic situations. The runway controller 
is responsible for safe and efficient traffic handling on the runway and the 
runway crossings; the ground controllers are responsible for the traffic on the 
taxiways in the surroundings of the runway. 
 
Aircraft may taxi across the active runway via the following procedure. First, the 
control over the taxiing aircraft is transferred from a ground controller to the 
runway controller. The runway controller specifies a crossing clearance to the 
taxiing aircraft and switches off the remotely controlled stopbar. The crew of the 
taxiing aircraft acknowledges the clearance, initiates taxiing across the runway 
and reports when the taxiing aircraft has vacated the runway. After passage of 
the stopbar, it is automatically switched on again.  
 
Standard communication, navigation and surveillance systems are used: 
communication between controllers and crews is by R/T systems, the pilots use 
their knowledge on the aerodrome layout and maps for taxiing, and ground 
radar tracking data of all aircraft and sufficiently large vehicles on the airport 
surface is shown on displays of the runway and ground controllers. The ATC 
system may generate two types of alerts to warn the runway controller: (1) a 
runway incursion alert for the situation that an aircraft is on the runway in front 
of an aircraft that has initiated to take off; (2) a stopbar violation alert for the 
situation that an aircraft crosses an active stopbar in the direction of the runway. 
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3 EVENT SEQUENCE-BASED SAFETY STUDY 
In the safety assessment of [16] several safety relevant scenarios were 
considered for the active runway crossing operation. For the purpose of the 
comparison in this study, we focus on a scenario that an aircraft is taking off and 
a taxiing aircraft is crossing the runway while it should not; thus a runway 
incursion is due to the taxiing aircraft. In particular, the event sequence-based 
study considers that the pilot of the taxiing aircraft starts crossing without 
contacting the runway controller (e.g. by misunderstanding the ground 
controller). The ET of the runway incursion scenario, given the taxiing aircraft is 
crossing while it should not, considers contributions to resolution of the runway 
incursion conflict by the pilots of both aircraft directly or following a call by the 
runway controller, who may have recognized the conflict directly or via an alert. 
The branching points in the ET differentiate between early, medium and late 
recognition of the conflict by the pilots and the runway controller. This approach 
was chosen as a systematic means to get hold on the variety in the timing of 
conflict detection and resolution events by the human operators in combination 
with the timing of the alerts and the remaining braking distance. The outcomes 
of the ET specify the timing of the resolution of the conflict (early/medium/late) 
or the inability to timely resolve it (accident). 
 
The parameter values of the ET are the probabilities of event occurrences. In the 
event sequence-based assessment, lower and upper bounds of the event 
probabilities were estimated by expert (controller and pilot) elicitation. 
Depending on the agent and the early/medium/late stage, the probabilities of 
the events (leading to resolution of the conflict) are in the range of 0.1 to 0.99. 
These probabilities must be interpreted as conditional probabilities in the ET. 
 
The discussed ET can be condensed in a simpler aggregated ET shown in Figure 
1, which neglects the resolution stage (early/medium/ late) and focuses on the 
contributions of no aircraft in take-off during the crossing (event 1aQ ), direct 
conflict recognition and resolution by the pilots (event 2aQ ), conflict recognition 
by the controller independently from the alert system that leads to effective 
warning of the pilots and resolution of the conflict by the pilots (event 3aQ ), and 
conflict recognition by the controller as result of an alert that leads to effective 
warning of the pilots and resolution of the conflict by the pilots (event 4aQ ).  
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Figure 1: Aggregated ET for runway incursion scenario 
The probabilities of the events in the aggregated ET are shown in Table 1. These 
data include the accident risk and they reveal that in the event sequence-based 
safety assessment it has been assumed that the pilots have a large contribution 
to avoiding a collision for the runway incursion scenario (about 99.96% of the 
cases), the controller can only add to this independently in about half of the 
cases, and the controller can effectively add to the collision avoidance after an 
ATC alert in about 94% of the cases. An explanation of the small contribution of 
the controller independent from the alert system is, that as the pilot of taxiing 
aircraft starts crossing without contacting the runway controller, the runway 
controller is not very likely to timely observe the conflict by own visual 
monitoring. In contrast, the effectiveness of the alert system is assessed to be 
high as it reduces the risk by a factor 16. 
 
Table 1: Event probabilities of the aggregated ET. 
Event probability 
Event Lower 
bound 
Geometric 
mean 
Upper 
bound 
Mean risk 
reduction 
factor 
1
aQ  No aircraft in take-off 0.75 0.75 0.75 4.0 
2
aQ  Pilots resolve conflict 0.995 0.99961 0.99997 2600 
3
aQ  Controller resolves conflict independently 0.38 0.52 0.71 2.1 
4
aQ  Controller resolves conflict via alert 0.906 0.938 0.970 16 
Accident (given aircraft crossing  
while it should not) 6.5E-8 2.2E-6 7.5E-5 
- 
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4 MULTI-AGENT DRM-BASED SAFETY STUDY 
4.1 MULTI-AGENT DYNAMIC RISK MODEL 
The multi-agent DRM of the runway incursion scenario is specified by a 
stochastic dynamic extension of the Petri net formalism [19] and is discussed in 
more detail in [18]. The main agents are the aircraft taking-off and taxiing, the 
pilots flying of the aircraft, the runway controller and the ATC system. Key 
aspects of the models of these agents are highlighted next. 
 
Taking-off Aircraft (AC-TO) 
The model of the taking-off aircraft represents the ground run, airborne 
transition and airborne climb-out phases during take-off and includes the 
possibility of a rejected take-off. The aircraft initiates take-off from a position 
near the runway threshold and it may be medium-weight or heavy-weight. 
 
Taxiing Aircraft (AC-TX) 
The model of the taxiing aircraft represents aircraft movements during taxiing, 
including braking as a means to avoid a collision. The aircraft enters the taxiway 
leading to the runway crossing at a position close to the remotely controlled 
stopbar and its entrance time is uniformly distributed around the take-off time 
of AC-TO. The aircraft may be medium-weight or heavy-weight. 
 
Surveillance (ATC subsystem) 
The model of the surveillance system provides position and velocity estimates for 
both aircraft. There is a chance that the surveillance system is not available, 
resulting in track loss. Surveillance data is used by the ATC alert system.  
 
Alerts (ATC subsystem) 
A stopbar violation alert (SVA) becomes active if the surveillance data indicate 
that AC-TX has passed an active stopbar. A runway incursion alert (RIA) becomes 
active if the surveillance data indicate that AC-TX is within a critical distance of 
the runway centre-line and AC-TO has exceeded a velocity threshold in front of 
the runway crossing. There is a chance that the alerts are not well functioning. 
 
R/T (ATC subsystem) 
The model for the R/T system between the runway controller and the aircraft 
crews accounts for the communication system of the aircraft, the communication 
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system of the controller, the tower communication system and the frequency 
selection of the aircraft communication system. The nominal status of these 
communication systems accounts for direct non-delaying communication. The 
model accounts for the chance of delay or failure of the communication systems. 
 
Pilot flying of the Taking-off Aircraft (PF -TO) 
The model for the performance of PF-TO accounts for performance of tasks such 
as auditory monitoring, visual monitoring, crew coordination, aircraft control, 
and conflict detection and reaction. The model includes dynamic representations 
of situation awareness about AC-TO, AC-TX and controller calls, a cognitive 
control mode of the pilot and task scheduling by the pilot. Initially, PF-TO is 
aware that take-off is allowed and initiates a take-off. During the take-off, PF-
TO visually monitors the traffic situation on the runway at stochastically 
distributed times. PF-TO may detect a conflict if AC-TX is observed to be within 
a critical distance of the runway or due to an R/T call by the runway controller 
(ATCo-R). Following conflict detection, PF-TO starts a collision avoiding braking 
action if it is expected that braking will stop AC-TO in front of AC-TX; otherwise 
it continues and may fly over AC-TX. 
 
Pilot Flying of Taxiing Aircraft (PF-TX) 
The model structure of PF-TX is similar to that of PF-TO. In the conflict scenario 
considered, PF-TX intends to continue taxiing on a regular taxiway (whereas 
actually the aircraft is on the runway crossing). During taxiing PF-TX visually 
monitors the traffic situation at stochastically distributed times. PF-TX may 
detect a conflict if AC-TX is within a critical distance of the runway, AC-TO 
approaches towards AC-TX and the speed of AC-TO exceeds a threshold value, 
or due to an R/T call of ATCo-R. Following conflict detection, PF-TX starts a 
collision avoiding braking action unless AC-TX already is within a critical 
distance of the runway centre-line; otherwise it continues and may pass the 
runway in front of AC-TO. 
 
Runway Controller (ATCo-R) 
The model for the performance of ATCo-R accounts for the performance of tasks 
such as visual monitoring, communication with aircraft crews, ATC coordination, 
and conflict detection and reaction. The model includes dynamic representations 
of the situation awareness about the aircraft and the alerts, a cognitive control 
mode and task scheduling. ATCo-R visually monitors the traffic situation on the 
runway and is supported the ATC alerts. ATCo-R may detect a safety-critical 
situation if AC-TX is observed to have passed the stopbar, or due to a stopbar 
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violation alert, or due to a runway incursion alert. Following detection of the 
safety-critical situation, ATCo-R instructs both AC-TX and AC-TO to hold. 
 
4.2 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
A key result of the Monte Carlo simulations is the probability of collision between 
the aircraft taxiing and taking-off. Since collision risks considered in air traffic 
are small, simulation speed-up by risk decomposition has been applied. Results 
presented earlier [17][18] indicate that a wrong intent situation awareness of the 
pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft is a condition with a strong effect on the 
accident risk. For the comparison with the risk results of the ET approach, we 
focus on the condition that the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft intends to 
proceed on a normal taxiway (i.e. without being aware to be heading to the 
runway crossing). In this situation the pilot of the taxiing aircraft crosses the 
runway without contacting the runway controller, which is the condition 
considered in the event sequence-based risk assessment. 
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Figure 2: Conditional accident probability results of the ET study (lower/upper bound and 
geometric mean) and of the DRM study (95% uncertainty interval and point estimate). 
 
To identify potential differences between model and reality and to evaluate their 
effect at the level of risk, a bias and uncertainty assessment method is an 
integrated part of the TOPAZ risk assessment methodology [20]. Results of a bias 
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and uncertainty assessment are reported in [18] and they reveal that lack of 
knowledge on pilot performance contributes mostly to uncertainty in the risk. 
The point estimate and 95% uncertainty interval of the conditional accident 
probability given the runway incursion are shown in Figure 2. For comparison, it 
also shows the results achieved by the ET-based study. 
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5 EVENTS IN THE MC SIMULATIONS 
5.1 DEFINITION OF EVENTS 
To improve the insight in the performance of the agents in the DRM, the relation 
of this performance with the accident risk and to support the comparison with 
the event sequence-based analysis, we defined and recorded event occurrences 
in the Monte Carlo simulations of the agent-based DRM. As an onset for the 
analysis of event occurrences in the Monte Carlo simulations of the agent-based 
DRM, Figure 3 presents events for conflict recognition and collision avoidance 
actions by the agents as well as relations between these events. For instance, 
Figure 3 indicates that an active stopbar violation alert (event 8E ) may result in 
conflict detection by ATCo-R (event 5E ) and this event, on its turn, may result in 
warnings specified by ATCo-R towards the PFs of both aircraft (events 6E and 7E ). 
The times of first occurrence of most events were recorded in the MC 
simulations. The occurrence of events 1E  , 3E and 5E was inferred from the 
occurrence of related events. 
 
Figure 3: Relations between events in the MC simulations of the DRM. Events in solid 
circles are recorded in the MC simulations, events in dashed circles are inferred from the 
relative timing of recorded events. 
  
 
 
 
 
18 NLR-TP-2011-291 July 2011  
 
5.2 RESULTS OF EVENT OCCURRENCES 
A total of 10 million Monte Carlo simulation runs were performed for the 
condition that the PF TX has the intent to proceed on a normal taxiway. In these 
runs a total of 1809 collisions were counted, which is consistent with the risk 
point estimate of 1.8E-4 for this condition found earlier. Table 2 shows the 
probabilities of the defined events and the conditional probabilities of these 
events given a collision. Key observations and explanations of the results in 
Table 2 are discussed next. 
 
Table 2: MC simulation results for the defined events: event probability and conditional 
event probability given a collision.     
Event Probabilities Agent ID Description ( )qP E  coll( | )qP E E  
PF-TO 1E  Detects conflict 9.92E-01 9.97E-01 
PF-TO 1E   Detects conflict by own observation 4.18E-02 5.89E-01 
PF-TO 2E  Initiates rejected take-off 5.66E-01 2.39E-01 
PF-TX 3E  Detects conflict 9.98E-01 9.13E-01 
PF-TX 3E   Detects conflict by own observation 2.21E-01 7.51E-01 
PF-TX 4E  Initiates braking 6.88E-01 7.13E-01 
ATCo-
R 5E  Detects conflict 9.93E-01 9.99E-01 
ATCo-
R 5E   Detects conflict by own observation 3.93E-01 2.28E-01 
ATCo-
R 6E  Warns pilots of TO AC 9.93E-01 9.54E-01 
ATCo-
R 7E  Warns pilots of TX AC 9.93E-01 5.69E-01 
ATC 
System 8E  
Stopbar violation alert is 
active 9.40E-01 9.99E-01 
ATC 
System 9E  
Runway incursion alert is 
active 3.41E-01 9.99E-01 
AC-TO 10E  Start take-off run 1 1 
AC-TO 11E  Come to stance 5.66E-01 0.00E00 
AC-TX 12E  Start taxiing 1 1 
AC-TX 13E  Come to stance 6.87E-01 2.95E-01 
AC-TO 
AC-TX collE  Collision 1.809E-04 1 
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Pilot flying of the Taking-off Aircraft (PF-TO) 
PF-TO detects the conflict (event 1E ) in 99.2% of all simulated conflict scenarios. 
Here, PF-TO detects the conflict by own observation (event 1E  ) in only 4.2% of all 
cases, whereas in the remaining 95.0% of all cases PF-TO detects the conflict via 
ATCo-R. Although PF-TO is very frequently monitoring the traffic situation and 
ATCo-R needs time to recognize the conflict and to warn PF-TO, the PF 
recognizes AC-TX as conflicting only if it is within a critical distance of 90 m to 
the runway centreline and ATCo-R can recognize AC-TX as conflicting as soon as 
it has passed the stopbar 
 
Of the simulation runs ending in a collision, in hindsight we can see that PF-TO 
detects the conflict (event 1E ) in 99.7% of these cases, PF-TO detects the conflict 
by own observation (event 1E  ) in 58.9% and via the controller in 40.8%. Thus for 
the conditional case given a collision it is found in hindsight that the probability 
of conflict detection by PF-TO is  higher than in the unconditional case and the 
contribution of ATCo-R to detection of the conflict by PF-TO is significantly 
lower than in the unconditional case. 
 
Pilot Flying of Taxiing Aircraft (PF-TX) 
PF-TX detects the conflict (event 3E ) in 99.8% of all simulated conflict scenarios. 
Here, PF-TX detects the conflict by own observation (event 3E  ) in 22.1% of the 
cases, whereas in the remaining 77.7% of all cases PF-TX detects the conflict via 
ATCo-R. Although ATCo-R needs time to recognize the conflict and to warn PF-
TX, the PF detects the conflict situation if it is recognized that AC-TO is taking 
off, whereas ATCo-R can already recognize the conflict as soon as the taxiing 
aircraft has passed the stopbar.  
 
Of the simulation runs ending in a collision, in hindsight we can see that PF-TX 
detects the conflict (event 3E ) in 91.3% of these cases, PF-TX detects the conflict 
self (event 3E  ) in 75.1% and via the controller in 16.2%. Thus for the conditional 
case given a collision it is found in hindsight that the probability of conflict 
detection by PF-TX is considerably lower than in the unconditional case and the 
contribution of ATCo-R to detection of the conflict by PF-TX is also significantly 
lower than in the unconditional case.  
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Runway Controller (ATCo-R) 
ATCo-R detects the conflict (event 5E ) in 99.3% of all simulated conflict 
scenarios. Here, ATCo-R detects the conflict by own observation (event 5E  ) in 
39.3% of all cases, whereas in the remaining 60.0% ATCo-R detects the conflict 
via the ATC alerting systems.  
 
In the simulation runs ending in a collision, ATCo-R detects the conflict 
(event 5E ) in 99.9% of these cases. Here, ATCo-R detects the conflict by own 
observation (event 5E  ) in 22.8% of these cases and via the ATC alert system in 
77.1% of these cases. Thus for the conditional case given a collision it is found in 
hindsight that the probability of conflict detection by ATCo-R is considerably 
larger than in the unconditional case and the contribution of the ATC alert 
system to detection of the conflict by ATCo-R is somewhat higher than in the 
unconditional case. 
 
The controller warns the pilots of the aircraft (events 6E , 7E ) in 99.3% of all 
simulated conflict scenarios, which is equal to the detection rate by the controller 
(event 5E ). In the runs ending in a collision, the probability of a warning is 
decreased to 95.4% for PF-TO and to 56.9% for PF-TX. A factor contributing to 
the larger decrease for PF-TX is that in this conflict scenario, PF-TX is not on the 
R/T frequency of ATCo-R and their communication is thus delayed. 
 
ATC Alerts 
The stopbar violation alert is active (event 8E ) in 94.0% of all scenarios and in 
99.9% of the cases ending in a collision. Mostly, it is not activated in situations 
that AC-TX stops close after the stopbar, such that the alert threshold has not 
yet been passed. 
 
The runway incursion alert is active (event 9E ) in 34.1% of all scenarios and in 
99.9% of the cases ending in a collision. It is not activated in situations where 
AC-TX taxies in front of AC-TO while it has not initiated take-off, or when AC-
TX taxies after AC-TO has passed the crossing position. 
 
Taking-off Aircraft (AC-TO) 
PF-TO initiates a rejected take-off (RTO) (event 2E ) in 56.6% of all cases and also 
in 56.6% of all cases AC-TO comes to stance (event 11E ). For the cases ending in 
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a collision, an RTO was initiated in 23.9% of the cases and the aircraft came to 
stance in 0.0% of the cases.  
 
Taxiing Aircraft (AC-TX) 
PF-TX initiates braking (event 4E ) in 68.8% of all cases and in 68.7% of all cases 
AC-TX comes to stance (event 13E ). In the cases that ended in a collision, braking 
was initiated in 71.3% of these cases and the aircraft came to stance in 29.5% of 
these cases.  
 
Other detailed results (not shown) indicate that AC-TO is predominantly well 
within the first 500 m of the runway when the conflict is detected by either of the 
agents (PF-TO, PF-TX, ATCo-R, ATC System) or when the agents take action to 
prevent an accident. In contrast,  for the cases ending in a collision, these events 
often occur when AC-TO is between 500 m and 1000 m; only for the detection of 
the conflict by the controller and the ATC alerts a considerable part of the PDF is 
below 500 m.  
 
Similar results (not shown) for AC-TX show that overall the front-wheel of AC-TX 
is predominantly within 100 m from the runway centre-line when the conflict is 
detected by PF-TO or PF-TX, and when they start their collision avoiding actions. 
Overall, the controller detects the conflict at an earlier stage, predominantly 
when the AC-TX is between 150 and 100 m, and this range overlaps with that of 
the stopbar violation alert. However, at the time that the controller has warned 
the pilots, AC-TX is predominantly already within 100 m from the runway 
centre-line. There is a considerable overlap between the cores of the PDFs of the 
position of AC-TX in general and given the occurrence of a collision. 
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6 SIMULATION OF CONDITIONS WITH AGENTS 
IN/OUT OF MONITORING ROLES OR 
CONTROL LOOPS  
The results of the analysis in last section provided insight in the performance of 
the various agents in the runway incursion scenario and its relation with collision 
risk. To better understand the potential of agents to restrict the risk increase in 
cases where the performance of other agents is affected, we performed 
additional Monte Carlo simulations in which we placed one or more agents out of 
the monitoring role or control loop. This was done for all the agents that are 
capable of detecting a conflict, namely PF-TO, PF-TX, ATCo-R and ATC System. 
The conditions for placing these agents out of the monitoring role or control 
loop are: 
 PF-TX does not actively monitor the traffic situation visually, such that PF-TX 
may only detect a conflict via a call of ATCo-R; 
 PF-TO does not actively monitor the traffic situation visually, such that PF-TO 
may only detect a conflict via a call of ATCo-R; 
 ATCo-R cannot communicate with the pilots; 
 ATC System does not specify alerts. 
These conditions for placing agents out of the monitoring role or control loop 
refer to the situation at the start and during the runway incursion scenario. These 
conditions were not assumed to hold prior to the occurrence of the runway 
incursion scenario. 
 
For all relevant combinations of agents in or out of the monitoring or control 
loop, the conditional collision risk of the runway incursion scenario considered in 
this paper was determined by Monte Carlo simulation. This gives rise to 12 
relevant combinations of conditions, which are shown in Table 3. Note that for 
conditions where ATCo-R is out of the control loop, it does not matter whether 
or not the ATC alerts are included in the control loop, as these can only be 
effective via ATCo-R. The runway incursion scenario considered earlier is case 
T1. For convenience Table 3 includes risk factors with respect to the lowest risk 
as obtained for case T1. 
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Table 3: Conditional collision risk results for various conditions with one or more agents 
out of the monitoring/control loop for the runway incursion scenario considered. 
Case PF-TX (monitor) 
PF-TO 
(monitor)
ATCo-R
(control) 
Alerts 
(control) 
Cond. 
risk 
Risk 
factor 
T1 yes yes yes yes 1.8E-4 1 
T2 no yes yes yes 1.0E-2 56.6 
T3 yes no yes yes 3.4E-4 1.89 
T4 yes yes no yes/no 2.2E-4 1.22 
T5 no no yes yes 1.7E-2 94.4 
T6 no yes no yes/no 1.7E-2 94.4 
T7 yes no no yes/no 1.9E-2 106 
T8 no no no yes/no 9.4E-2 522 
T9 yes yes yes no 1.9E-4 1.06 
T10 no yes yes no 1.2E-2 66.7 
T11 yes no yes no 2.1E-3 11.7 
T12 no no yes no 3.4E-2 189 
 
Next we discuss key results of Table 3 in relation with the earlier presented 
results on events in the MC simulations of the runway incursion scenario (Table 
2). 
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario increases by a factor 522 if 
none of the agents would be actively monitoring the traffic situation (case T8). In 
this case an accident is thus only prevented by chance, especially by the 
coincidental timing of the runway incursion with respect to the start of the take-
off run. The accident risk of case T8 thus forms an upper bound for this 
particular runway incursion scenario.  
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario increases by a factor 1.06 if 
the ATC alert systems are not available (case T9). Stated differently, the presence 
of an ATC alert system barely reduces the collision risk. This is remarkable given 
the results for events 5E and 5E   (Table 2), which show that if the ATC alert 
system is available, it warns ATCo-R before ATCo-R detected the conflict by own 
observation in 60% of the cases. Although the ATC alert system thus effectively 
supports ATCo-R, the results for case T9 show that the agents can well cope 
without the alerting system. In particular, even though the controller now 
regularly recognizes the conflict later, the conflict recognition time by the 
controller and by the pilots is only affected to a limited extent, such that the risk 
is increased by a factor 1.06 only.    
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The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario increases by a factor 1.22 if 
ATCo-R is out-of-the-loop (case T4). Thus the performance of ATCo-R in the 
resolution of the runway scenario has a small effect only on reducing the 
collision risk. This result may be seen as quite surprising, given the results for 
events 1E , 1E  , 3E and 3E  (Table 2) showing that the controller warns the pilots 
flying of the taking-off and taxiing aircraft in 95% and 78% of all cases before 
they have detected the conflict themselves. Notwithstanding this good 
performance of the controller, if the controller is placed out of the control loop in 
the modelled scenario, pilots can mostly detect the conflict themselves and react 
timely to avoid a collision, such that the risk increase is small. 
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario is increased by a factor 1.89 
in the (hypothetical) case that PF-TO is  not actively monitoring the traffic 
situation, but might still be warned by ATCo-R (case T3). If in addition to the lack 
of monitoring by PF-TO also ATCo-R is out of the control loop (case T7), then 
the risk is majorly higher by a factor 56 with respect to case T3. ATCo-R often 
warns PF-TO at an early stage, namely if AC-TO is well within the first 500 m of 
the runway. This early stage warning implies that ATCo-R can considerably 
restrict the risk increase of a non-monitoring PF-TO, as is manifest from the 
comparison of the risk factors in cases T3 and T7.  
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario is increased majorly by a 
factor 56.6 in the (hypothetical) case that PF-TX is not actively monitoring the 
traffic situation, but might still be warned by ATCo-R (case T2). If in addition to 
the lack of monitoring by PF-TX also ATCo-R is out of the control loop (case T6), 
then the risk increases by a factor 1.7 with respect to case T2. AC-TX is often 
close to the runway when ATCo-R warns PF-TX (event E7). Then warnings of 
ATCo-R to PF-TX are often too late to prevent AC-TX entering a collision-critical 
area. Therefore, ATCo-R can barely restrict the risk increase due to a non-
monitoring PF-TX, as is manifest from the comparison of the risk factors in cases 
T2 and T6.  
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario is increased majorly by a 
factor 94.4 in the case that only ATCo-R would be monitoring (while supported 
by the ATC alert system) and the pilots of both aircraft would not be monitoring, 
but may be warned by ATCo-R (case T5). The attained risk level is similar to the 
other cases where only one human operator is actively monitoring the traffic 
situation (cases T6 and T7). It shows that only one human actively monitoring 
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human cannot effectively restrict the risk increase due to the malperformance of 
other operators.  
 
Cases T10, T11, T12 represent situations where the ATC alert system is not 
available and also one or both of the pilots flying are not actively monitoring the 
traffic situation. It follows from comparison with the similar cases including the 
ATC alert system (i.e. cases T2, T3 and T5, respectively) that the effect of the 
non-availability of the ATC alert systems varies a lot.  
 In the cases without active monitoring by PF-TX (T10 versus T2) the risk 
increases by a factor 1.2 only, indicating that the alerts are often too late to 
warn the PF-TX.  
 In the cases without active monitoring by PF-TO (T11 versus T3) the risk 
increases by a factor 6, indicating that in this context the ATC alerts often 
warn ATCo-R such that ATCo-R can timely warn PF-TO.  
 In the cases without monitoring by both pilots (T12 versus T5) a risk increase 
by a factor 2 is achieved, which is intermediate between the above indicated 
values.  
These results indicate that the potential effectiveness of the ATC alert system can 
be better than the factor 1.06 found in case T9 if one or both pilots 
underperform. In the context given it is most important for timely warning of PF-
TO.   
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7 DISCUSSION 
In this paper we compared risk assessment studies of a particular runway 
incursion scenario by an ET approach versus a multi-agent DRM approach. The 
focus in this paper is on a comparison of quantitative differences attained. 
Nevertheless, already at the qualitative level it can be argued that for the 
considered runway incursion scenario the ET-based risk model has clear 
limitations with regard to the representation of the dynamics of the scenario, the 
interactions between agents in the scenario, the variability of the performance of 
the agents in the scenario and the contextual conditions of the scenario. As a 
result of such limitations, the ET approach lacks transparency of the 
development of the risk model, the quantification of the event probabilities, the 
risk results and the feedback to the design. At a qualitative level it can be argued 
that the multi-agent DRM uses direct representations of the dynamics, agents’ 
interactions, performance variability and contextual conditions, and as a result 
attains a better transparency for the development of the risk model, the 
quantification of its parameters, the explanation of its results and the feedback 
to design.   
 
7.1 RISK LEVELS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Figure 2 shows that the accident risk was assessed to be considerably lower by 
the ET-based assessment in comparison with the DRM-based assessment. In 
particular the mean risk assessed by the ET is a factor 82 below the risk point 
estimate of the DRM.  
 
The ET-based results for the risk reduction contributions of agents shown in 
Table 1 indicate that pilots reduce the risk by about a factor 2600, the controller 
reduces the risk by about a factor 2 and the ATC alert system supports a risk 
reduction by a factor 16. The DRM-based study shows that the level of risk is 
only manifest from the totality of the performance and interactions of all human 
operators and technical systems. As such, a overview of risk reduction 
contributions of different agents such as provided by the ET study cannot be 
derived by the DRM approach. Rather differences in risk between different 
constellations of agents being in or out of the monitoring role or control loop 
can be derived, such as shown in Table 3. It follows from this table that the risk 
is only reduced by a factor 1.06 by the ATC alert system. This is in contrast with 
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the design objective of the ATC alert system to significantly reduce the runway 
incursion risk, as well as with the risk reduction factor 16 by the ATC alert 
system such as assessed by the ET approach. 
 
7.2 EVENTS IN ET AND DRM  
In this study we showed a variety of events and their probabilities in the ET- and 
DRM-based safety assessments. With respect to the values of the event 
probabilities, a key difference between the approaches is that in the ET-based 
analysis they are mostly input, whereas in the DRM-based analysis they are 
output. In particular, in the ET-based assessment the event probabilities were 
based on interviews with operational experts, who expressed their opinion on 
the possibilities to recognize and resolve conflicts at a particular stage. Only for 
the incident and accident events the ET-based assessment provides probability 
values as output. In contrast, in the DRM-based assessment the probability 
values of the shown events are all outcomes emerging from the MC simulations 
of the DRM, whether they refer to events for conflict recognition and/or 
resolution by agents or to aircraft collisions. In particular we obtained the event 
probabilities by evaluating a large number of MC simulation runs of the runway 
incursion scenario, with the variability in the performance of the agents as 
specified in the DRM. The thus obtained event probabilities could be related to 
the occurrence of collisions and to variables of agents (e.g. aircraft positions), 
and a variety of event combinations could be evaluated. As such a considerably 
more diverse overview of relations between events and collision risk could be 
obtained by the DRM-based approach.  
 
7.3 SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR FEEDBACK TO DESIGN 
Designers of an operation need to know main risk contributors and effective risk 
reduction means. Such risk analysis knowledge helps them to optimize the 
design from a safety perspective. There are a number of methods for such risk 
analysis in the DRM-based approach: 
A. Bias and uncertainty assessment of the DRM-based accident risk includes an 
evaluation of the sensitivity of the risk for changes in parameter values of the 
DRM. Operational aspects with large effects on the are focus points for 
designers [18].  
B. The evaluation of the occurrence of conflict detection and resolution events 
of the agents, both unconditional and conditional given a collision, and the 
evaluation of performance variables (e.g. aircraft position) given the event 
occurrences (Section 5).  
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C. The evaluation of risk effects due to placing agents out of monitoring or 
control loops. It gives insight in accident risk variations of the runway 
incursion scenario and in the capability of agents to compensate the lack of 
detection or control actions of other agents. 
Methods A and C show that the accident risk is not sensitive for some aspects of 
the operation in the good visibility context considered. For instance, the risk 
would increase only by a factor 1.06 without an ATC alert system and it would 
increase only by a factor 1.22 if the controller would be out of the control loop at 
all. However, the risk is quite sensitive for some other aspects of the operation 
and the risk may increase by up to a factor 500 if none of the agents would be 
monitoring or in the control loop and a collision is only avoided by sheer luck.  
 
Comparison of the results achieved by methods B and C clearly show that the 
risk is not manifest from the performance of individual human operators and 
technical systems, nor from the sole relations between human operators and/or 
technical systems, but only from the totality of the performance and interactions 
of all human operators and technical systems in the operational context 
considered. In particular, it follows from the analysis by method B that in about 
94% of the runway incursion scenarios at least one of the alert types is active and 
in 60% of the scenarios the alert system warns the controller before (s)he has 
detected the conflict independently. Nevertheless, the analysis by method C 
shows that the risk increases only by a factor 1.06 without an ATC alert system. 
The reasoning is even stronger for the contribution of the controller. The model 
results indicate that the controller detects the conflict and warns the pilots in 
99.3% of the cases and that in 95% and 78% of the cases the controller is able to 
warn the pilots flying of the taking-off or taxiing aircraft, respectively, before 
they have detected the conflict independently. In spite of this laudable 
performance of the controller in the model, the accident risk would only increase 
by a factor 1.22 if the controller would not play a role at all in the resolution of 
the runway incursion scenario. It is only by considering the totality of the 
interactions between the agents and the variability in their performance in huge 
numbers of simulations that reveals the effects on accident risk due to aspects of 
the operation. 
 
Insight in effective impact on the risk of taking agents out of the monitoring role 
or control loop was not obtained by the ET approach. For instance, the ET-based 
results suggest that the risk is reduced by a factor 16 due to the ATC alert 
system. In this ET a change in the operation, such as leaving out an ATC alert 
system, would imply that alert-related events cannot occur. Assuming that the 
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other event probabilities remain the same, this would lead to a major risk 
increase by a factor 16. However, the assumption that the other event 
probabilities remain the same appears not to be true. In conclusion, the ET based 
analysis does not effectively support safety analysis for feedback to design. 
 
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPERT JUDGEMENT 
As a result of the conclusion that the level of safety need not be manifest from 
the performance of individual human operators and technical systems, nor from 
the sole relations between human operators and/or technical systems, it also 
follows that assessing the contributions for prevailing accidents by interviewing 
single operators (pilots and controllers) and by judging their contributions, does 
not well account for the complexity of the interactions in conflict scenarios and 
thereby may well lead to inaccurate safety assessment results. For instance, 
based on controller interviews it was assessed in the ET-based study that the 
controller, when supported by an ATC alert system, would have a large effect on 
reducing the accident risk of the runway incursion scenario. However, for an 
individual controller it is not well possible to judge the probability that a 
controller warning reaches the pilots before they have detected the conflict 
independently. Even more importantly, it is not possible for the individual 
controller to quantify the effectiveness of a controller warning at the level of 
accident risk reduction, since it supposes an evaluation of all other possibilities 
of other agents to detect and resolve the conflict scenario. 
 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP SIMULATIONS 
The contrast between the seemingly good performance of a human operator and 
the limited effect of this performance on the accident risk in a conflict scenario, 
as found by the large scale Monte Carlo simulations of the multi-agent DRM-
based study in this paper, poses limitations on the safety conclusions that can be 
attained by other types of simulations. In the air traffic control domain, new 
concepts are regularly evaluated by human-in-the-loop simulations, in which the 
performance of (real) air traffic controllers is evaluated in a simulated 
environment. For operations on the airport this is done in tower simulators, 
where simulated aircraft movements on the aerodrome are projected in a 360 
degrees view, the controllers are supported by their usual ATC systems (which 
may include alerts) and the controllers can communicate with pseudo-pilots who 
control the movements of the simulated aircraft. The numbers of aircraft handled 
in such simulations are similar to what can be achieved in reality, e.g. a runway 
controller may handle about 25 to 40 aircraft per hour. Human-in-the-loop 
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simulation experiments typically last several days and often aim to evaluate 
several configurations, typically leading to some hundreds of aircraft handled in 
a particular configuration. In human-in-the-loop simulations occasionally 
conflict scenarios may be instantiated and the effectiveness of a controller to 
detect the conflict and warn pilots may be evaluated. Whereas it is manifest that 
the numbers of conflict scenarios that can be evaluated in human-in-the-loop 
simulations are far too small to evaluate safety up to the level of accident risk, 
the results of this paper moreover indicate that results on the performance of 
human operators in such simulations say little about their contributions to 
safety. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical result of a human-in-the-loop 
simulation experiment that a controller is able to warn the pilots in conflict 
situations in the large majority of conflicts (say 95%). This might be interpreted 
as an indication that the controller is contributing considerably to avoiding 
accidents, thus forming an important safety barrier. However, the presented 
results provide an example where the controller warns the pilots in 99% of the 
cases and still the accident risk would increase only slightly without any 
contributions of the controller due to the performance of the other agents in the 
operation. More in general, the results of this paper indicate that if the number 
of simulations is not sufficient to estimate the accident risk of a conflict scenario, 
it is hard to judge from the performance of individual agents what their effect on 
safety at the level of accident risk may be. 
 
As a way forward for using human-in-the-loop simulations in safety assessment, 
aspects of the performance variability of human operators in safety relevant 
scenarios may be measured and such measurement results may be used to 
support the development of appropriate agent models in a DRM. Detailed 
discussion of such coupling of human-in-the-loop simulations and dynamic risk 
modelling is out of the scope of this paper. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
Considerably different results were obtained in the accident risk assessments of 
the complex socio-technical system involved in the runway incursion scenario. 
The Monte Carlo simulations of the multi-agent DRM uniquely show that the risk 
is not manifest from the performance of individual human operators and 
technical systems, nor from the sole relations between human operators and/or 
technical systems, but only from the totality of the performance and interactions 
of all human operators and technical systems in the operational context 
considered. These findings imply that judging the contributions of single human 
operators or technical systems for prevailing accidents may neglect the 
complexity of the interactions in socio-technical systems and thereby lead to 
inaccurate safety assessment results.  
 
In conclusion, in this paper we showed that not only in theory but also in actual 
safety assessment of a realistic air traffic operation, multi-agent dynamic risk 
modelling has a considerable number of advantages over event sequence-based 
approaches. We have also shown that the findings have significant ramifications 
for the evaluation and testing of novel operations in air traffic management: 
commonly applied analysis processes, such as human-in-the-loop simulations, 
model development, model validation and feedback to design, appear to have a 
serious lack in capturing the safety related impacts of interactions between the 
multiple agents involved in such novel operations. 
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